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A SURVEY OF ILLINOIS EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Susan Marie Connor*
In 1980, the Illinois legislature enacted the Human Rights Act' to consoli-
date and expand upon several then-existing employment discrimination
statutes.2 The Human Rights Act prohibits an employer' from making em-
ployment decisions' on the basis of "unlawful discrimination," a term de-
fined as "discrimination against a person because of his or her race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, handicap, or un-
favorable discharge from the military service .... ,,I In addition, five provisions
* Assistant Professor, John Marshall Law School; B.A., Albertus Magnus College;
M.A., University of Hawaii; J.D., University of Hawaii.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to 9-102 (1981). The Human Rights Act was enacted to
"secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination because of race, col-
or, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, or
unfavorable discharge from military service in connection with employment, real estate trans-
actions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations." Id.
§ 1-102(A). This Article addresses only the subject of employment discrimination.
2. Employment discrimination statutes superseded by the Human Rights Act include: Il-
linois Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1455, 1978 Il. Laws 1740, repealed
by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 111. Laws 4854; Equal
Opportunities for the Handicapped Act, Pub. Act No. 77-1211, 1977 Ill. Laws 2169, repealed
by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 Ill. Laws 4854; Age
Discrimination Act, 1967 Ill. Laws 2044, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No.
81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 111. Laws 4854; Violation of Civil Rights, 1961 Ill. Laws 1983, repealed
by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 111. Laws 4854; Fair
Employment Practices Act, 1961 Il. Laws 1845, repeated by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub.
Act No. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 Ill. Laws 4854; Human Relations Commission, 1947 Ill. Laws
1680, 1994, amended by Pub. Act. No. 76-1389, § 1, Pub. Act No. 76-1789, § 1, and Pub. Act
No. 80-57, § 40, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979
11. Laws 4854.
3. An employer is defined as any person employing 15 or more persons within Illinois for
20 or more calendar weeks during a year. Moreover, the state, its political subdivisions or
governmental units, and all parties to public contracts, joint apprenticeships, and training com-
mittees are included within the statutory definition of an employer without any requirement
regarding the number of employees retained. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-101(B) (1981). In addi-
tion, if the discrimination complained bf is based upon a person's physical or mental handicap,
an employer is subject to the Human Rights Act irrespective of the number of persons he
employs. Id. § 2-101(B) (1). The Act also applies to employment agencies and labor organiza-
tions. Id. § 2-102(C). However, certain religious organizations are partially excluded from the
Act's definition of an employer. Id. § 2-101(B) (2). See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
4. The term employment decision has been defined broadly under the Act. For example,
decisions to "refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promo-
tion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline,
tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment" are within the scope of the Human
Rights Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 68, § 2-102(A) (1981). Furthermore, analogous provisions regu-
late employment agencies and labor organizations. See id. § 2-102(B), (C).
5. Id. § 1-103(Q).
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of the Illinois Constitution6 buttress the Human Rights Act by prohibiting
various forms of discrimination. Several exceptions to the Act exist. For ex-
ample, an employer will not violate the Act if an employer hires or selects
employees because of: bona fide occupational qualifications;' veteran's pre-
ference laws or regulations;' merit and retirement systems' or the results of
professionally-developed ability tests provided these are not used as a sub-
terfuge or do not have the effect of unlawful discrimination;' 0 or any other
factor the Act does not prohibit."
Because the Human Rights Act has been effective little more than two
years,' this Article will discuss the Act's major substantive provisions as
6. Five provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution are relevant to discrimination cases.
Article I, § 1, the state's inherent and inalienable rights provision provides: "All men are by
nature free and independent and have certain inherent and inalienable rights among which are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights and the protection of property,
courts are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
ILL. CONST. art. I, §1. Article I, § 2 sets forth the state's due process and equal protection
clauses: "[N]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law
nor be denied the equal protection of the laws." Id. § 2. The constitution also contains an equal
rights amendment which provides: "[E]qual protection .. . shall not be denied or abridged
on account of sex...." Id. § 18. Furthermore, discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, creed, national ancestry, sex, and physical or mental handicap expressly is pro-
hibited. Id. § 19. Finally, the constitution guarantees religious freedom. Id. § 3.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(A) (1981). In Schoneberg v. Grundy County Special
Educ. Coop., 67 II App. 3d 899, 385 N.E.2d 351 (3d Dist. 1979), the court held that maleness
is not a bona fide occupational qualification for the job of fourth grade teacher. This is the only
Illinois decision to date considering the defense of a bona fide occupational qualification under
the Act. See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 2-4, at 137-49 (1980) (discussing definition and proof of a
bona fide occupational qualification defense).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(B) (1981). See Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979) (Supreme Court held that a law preferring veterans for state civil service
jobs did not violate the federal equal protection clause even though it tended to exclude women
from such jobs).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(D) (1981).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(E) (1981). Presently, there is no Illinois case law on this
point; however, the use of professionally developed ability tests to make employment decisions
has been litigated extensively in the federal courts. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975) (general ability tests did not measure sufficiently qualifications for employ-
ment and the tests unfairly were directed to experienced white workers in violation of Title
VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII prohibited an employer from
requiring employees to take a general intelligence test and to have graduated from high school
where the effect of such requirements was to disadvantage black applicants and where the re-
quirements were not shown to predict job performance). See also Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1981) (procedures for using tests as criteria
for job selection); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 65-131 (1976
& Supp. 1979) (comprehensive examination of the use of scored tests in employment practices)
[hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(A) (1981).
12. The substantive provisions of the Human Rights Act became fully effective July 1,
1980. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-101 (1981).
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they apply to each class of protected persons. It also will consider case law
which was decided under the previous statutes, particularly to the extent
that it remains applicable or elucidates the new Act, and assess trends or
.probable results under the Act. In addition, because the Illinois Constitu-
tion provides particular protections against employment discrimination for
certain classes of individuals, this Article will examine relevant constitu-
tional law. Finally, there exists several federal statutory 3 and constitu-
tional" protections related to the field of employment discrimination. The
Illinois courts have held that in the absence of controlling Illinois authority,
the federal decisions, particularly in the area of fair employment and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are "relevant precedents and can serve
as a useful guide."" Accordingly, this Article will discuss the federal law of
employment discrimination to the extent that it has been adopted or other-
wise is relevant in understanding state law.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY OVERVIEW
Constitutional
Before the substantive provisions of Illinois employment discrimination
law can be discussed, a general overview of the basic structure of an employment
discrimination case should be considered. An employment discrimination case
may be based on constitutional or statutory grounds. Fundamental differences
exist between these two choices. In general, a constitutional challenge attacks a
statute or some other form of state action,"' whereas a statutory challenge
often attacks a private employer's actions.'" Because the Illinois courts
13. See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. I 1979); Vocational Rehabilitation Acts, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-3 (1976).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . .deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
15. Schoneberg v. Grundy County Special Educ. Coop., 67 Ill. App. 3d 899, 905, 385
N.E.2d 351, 357 (3d Dist. 1979). See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fair Employment Prac-
tices Comm'n, 49 II1. App. 3d 796, 805, 365 N.E.2d 535, 541 (1st Dist. 1977) (federal ex-
perience can "serve as a useful guide" when determining whether discrimination violates
Illinois law); City of Cairo v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 21 I. App. 3d 358, 363,
315 N.E.2d 344, 348 (1st Dist. 1974) (provisions of federal and Illinois law regarding racial
discrimination are so nearly identical that federal decisions dealing with the issue are relevant).
16. Constitutional restraints generally apply only when state action is involved. See Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (a warehouseman's proposed sale of goods pursuant
to a state law providing for a lien remedy was not state action because the law did not delegate
the exclusive prerogative of the state sovereign to the merchant); Aldridge v. Boys, 98 Il1. App.
3d 803, 424 N.E.2d 886 (4th Dist. 1981) (collective bargaining agreement between agent of
teachers at a state school and state department of personnel constituted sufficient state action).
See generally Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State
Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221.
17. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976); Human Rights Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 68. § 2-102 (1981).
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generally adopt the federal interpretation of constitutional and statutory
cases, 8 this discussion will be framed in the context of federal law.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the constitu-
tional provision upon which employment discrimination challenges typically
are based,' 9 does not prohibit the states or the federal government from
creating employment classifications and treating persons differently on the
basis of those classifications. Provided that no "suspect classification"" ° is
created nor any "fundamental right"' is infringed, the state has broad
discretion to create any distinctions which serve legitimate governmental
purposes and are rationally related to those purposes.2" The Illinois Supreme
Court, when analyzing the state's actions, 3 has even held that in the absence of
a fundamental right or suspect classification, the state need not articulate
18. For example, the Illinois court decided Lavin v. Board of Educ., 22 111. App. 3d 555,
317 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist. 1974), in light of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
which held that due process only applies when persons have been deprived of their fourteenth
amendment rights. For additional examples, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
19. Employment discrimination cases also arise under the due process clause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (suit maintained under due process clause of fifth
amendment against employer who discriminated because of employee's communist beliefs);
United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975) (due process clause of fifth amendment
protects individual's right to hold private employment and remain free from unreasonable
governmental interference); Shaw v. Hospital Auth. of Cobb County, 507 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.
1975) (podiatrist denied staff membership by hospital authority successfully maintained suit
under due process clause).
20. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (classifications based upon race
are suspect). In Illinois, classifications based upon race, gender, and alienage are suspect. See
People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 111. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975) (alienage);
People v. Ellis, 57 Il1. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974) (gender); City of Cairo v. Fair Employ-
ment Practices Comm'n, 21 Il1. App. 3d 358, 315 N.E.2d 344 (5th Dist. 1974) (race).
21. The right to employment is not a fundamental right. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized the following fundamental rights under the equal protection clause: Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (right to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (access to the courts).
22. This analysis has been termed "minimal scrutiny." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 994-96 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (a statute which banned advertising on vehicles
but which permitted an owner to advertise his business on his own vehicles did not violate the
equal protection clause because the state contended the law would reduce accidents by
eliminating distractions to motorists and pedestrians); People v. Grammer, 62 Il1. 2d 393, 342
N.E.2d 371 (1976) (a higher penalty for father-daughter incest than for mother-son incest held
not violative of the federal equal protection clause because fathers can more readily coerce an
incestuous relationship and such relationships may result in more severe consequences for a
daughter).
23. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 Il. 2d 402, 372 N.E.2d 74 (1977) (statute which imposed
additional taxes on farmland converted to other uses deemed a taxpaying classification ra-
tionally based on an effort to preserve farmland and open spaces); Friedman & Rochester, Ltd.
v. Walsh, 67 Il1. 2d 413, 367 N.E.2d 1325 (1977) (classification which differentiated benefits
for private and public annuitants and pensioners upheld because there was a reasonable and
conceivable basis for the differentiation); Spaulding v. Illinois Community College Bd., 64 Ill.
2d 449, 356 N.E.2d 339 (1976) (statute providing for a referendum when planning annexation
of territory to an existing community college district, but not when creating a new district, did
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the reasons justifying the state's exercise of its discretion.2 ' If the courts can
conceive of a reasonable set of facts that would sustain the legislative
distinction, the distinction does not violate the Constitution.2"
The courts' analysis changes, however, when suspect classes or fundamental
rights are involved. In such cases, the burden of proving the constitutional-
ity of the state's action is far greater. First, for the infringement of a right
to be justified the state must prove that the statute advances a compelling
interest rather than merely a legitimate interest." In addition, the means
employed "must be the least restrictive available and must be necessary to
achieve the desired end." 27 This two-prong test is known as "strict
scrutiny." 28 It has been noted that in the federal courts "scrutiny that is
'strict' in theory [is] fatal in fact.'' 29 Because strict scrutiny is used in Illi-
nois,3" the Illinois courts do not defer to legislation or policy which creates
distinctions based upon suspect classifications, and the courts routinely find
such classifications unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.'
Equal protection claims generally fall into one of three categories. A
plaintiff may argue, for example, that a particular statutory scheme 1) is
facially discriminatory;32 2) has a disproportionate impact;33 or 3) is facially
not violate the equal protection clause because annexation and creation are substantially differ-
ent procedures).
24. In Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 Ill.2d 402, 425, 372 N.E.2d 74, 85 (1977), the court recog-
nized that the statute need not include the reasons for the classifications established under it.
25. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute held unconstitutional when there
were means available to the state to effectuate compliance with a divorced parent's support
obligations without impinging upon the parents' right to marry). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 22, § 16-6, at 1000-02.
26. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (compelling state interest test trig-
gered by classifications which deny "food, shelter and other necessities of life"); People v.
Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974) (no compelling state interest for statute which per-
mitted a seventeen-year-old male to be tried as an adult but prohibited the same treatment for
a female, thus held as an unconstitutional classification based on sex); Wheeler v. City of
Rockford, 69 Il. App. 3d 220, 387 N.E.2d 358 (2nd Dist. 1979) (ordinance regulating massage
establishments which allowed massages to be given only by a person of the same sex held un-
constitutional because not based on a compelling state interest).
27. Helvey v. Rednour, 86 Ill. App. 3d 154, 158-59, 408 N.E.2d 17, 21 (5th Dist. 1980). Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court demands that rules promulgated by the government be "substantially
related to the achievement of . . . [the] objectives" of the rules in question. Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
28. See Helvey v. Rednour, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 158-59, 408 N.E.2d at 21.
29. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
30. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
31. See People v. Grammer, 62 Ill. 2d 393, 342 N.E.2d 371 (1976).
32. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), a state statute which allowed only
white males over 21 years of age to serve as jurors was held to be facially discriminatory and
consequently violative of the equal protection clause.
33. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Court invalidated a state constitu-
tional provision prohibiting interference with a real property owner's right to dispose of his
real estate because it permitted private racial discrimination in the housing market); Anderson
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neutral but is enforced discriminatorily."' A disproportionate impact case
involves state action that is neutral both in its terms and in its enforcement
but results in a disproportionate impact on a suspect class. In a constitu-
tional case based upon disproportionate impact, the plaintiff must prove
that the statute is premised on a discriminatory purpose.3" This type of dis-
crimination is exceedingly difficult to prove because the plaintiff must es-
tablish that the act was intended to prejudice a particular group. 6
This test used in disproportionate impact cases was established in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney. 7 In Feeney, the plaintiff argued
that because ninety-eight percent of the Massachusetts veterans were male, a
statute preferring veterans for civil service jobs so inevitably disadvantaged
women that the adverse consequences were not "unintentional." The
United States Supreme Court rejected this argument stating that
" '[d]iscriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or in-
tent as awareness of the consequences." 38 The Court then explained that
purposeful discrimination consists of action "selected or reaffirmed . . .
'because of' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."" The Court conceded that the ninety-eight percent to two percent
male-female disparity was of such great magnitude that it could support an
inference of discriminatory purpose. Nevertheless, the Court observed that the
legislature had been motivated by a legitimate consideration-the employment
of veterans-when it enacted the legislation. Therefore, the Court was
satisfied that the statute had not been enacted because it would discriminate
against women but in spite of that consequence."0 The Court's analysis in
Feeney should impart a rather clear impression of how difficult it is to prove
purposeful discrimination in a constitutional equal protection claim."'
v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (Court invalidated election law requiring designation of can-
didate's race because the effect of the law was racial discrimination).
34. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (statute which required a permit
for the construction of laundries in wooden buildings was found unconstitutional because
6perationally, all Chinese applicants were denied permits while all other applicants, except one,
were granted licenses).
35. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Washington Court considered the
constitutionality of a police department's entrance examination which blacks failed four times
as often as whites. The Court imposed an intent requirement, noting that a disproportionate
impact alone would not trigger strict scrutiny. Rather, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 239-42. Subsequently, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court reaffirmed Washington and stated that a plaintiff
need prove only that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the decision. Such a
requirement shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to show that the same result would occur
without this impermissible purpose. Id. at 264-68. See generally Seller, The Impact of Intent
on Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 84 DICK. L. REV. 363 (1980).
36. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1976).
37. 442 U.S. 256 (1976).
38. Id. at 279.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 279-81.
41. See generally Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assess-
ment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1979).
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Statutory
To understand the statutory basis upon which an Illinois plaintiff sub-
jected to discrimination may proceed, a brief analysis of Title VII is warranted
because the Illinois Human Rights Act is significantly similar to Title VII 2
and the Illinois courts routinely consult and rely upon the federal law."3
Under the federal statute," plaintiffs may proceed under one or more of
the following three theories of discrimination. First, if an employment practice
is facially discriminatory, the plaintiff need prove only that the rule disad-
vantaged him or her to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimina-
tion under Title VII.'" If plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case and
the defendant is unable to prove that a business necessity, '" a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification reasonably necessary for the performance of the
job, 7 or some other statutory defense 8 justified the practice, the plaintiff
will prevail.
42. Both acts prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Moreover, both statutes prohibit retaliation by the employer against an individual who
exercises his statutorily created rights. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2,
2000e-3 (1976) and Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-103(Q), 6-101 (1981). In
addition, the Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status, age,
handicap, or unfavorable discharge from the military. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(Q)
(1981). Other federal legislation prohibits age and handicap discrimination. See supra note 13.
Title VII provides a two-track procedure for discrimination cases. First, individuals, or per-
sons acting on their behalf, may file charges of employment discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC then investigates the charge and
determines whether reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge is true. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1976). In the event that the parties to the dispute are unable to reach a con-
ciliatory agreement, either the persons aggrieved, or the EEOC on their behalf, may bring a
civil action in federal court. Id. § 2000e-5(f). Alternatively, the government has independent
statutory authority to investigate and act on a charge that any person or group is engaged in a
pattern and practice of discrimination prohibited under Title VII. Id. § 2000e-6(e). If a state or
local government has perpetuated such a pattern and practice of discrimination, however, the
attorney general is empowered to investigate and act on the charge. Exec. Order No. 12,068, 3
C.F.R. 204 (1978). Once the individual plaintiffs have followed Title VII's administrative
obstacle course and the case is before a court, the court hears the case in a trial de novo. The
EEOC's reasonable cause conclusion is not determinative of the issues in the case.
Unlike the procedure under Title VII which provides for a trial de novo in the district court,
the Human Rights Act limits the judicial role to review of the Illinois Human Rights Commis-
sion's decisions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-111 (1981). For example, in City of Chicago v. Il-
linois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 87 Ill. App. 3d 597, 410 N.E.2d 136 (lst Dist.
1980), the court stated: "[Tihe reviewing court must examine the record to determine whether the
discrimination was proved by a preponderance of the evidence and whether applying that stan-
dard of proof the-agency's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence." Id. at 601,
410 N.E.2d at 140 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 79
Ill. App. 3d 446, 451, 398 N.E.2d 619, 623 (2d Dist. 1979)).
43. See supra notes 15 & 18 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 13.
45. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1147-96.
46. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (a business necessity did not justify
a requirement that all job applicants pass an intelligence test and have a high school diploma,
as these requirements disadvantaged more black than white applicants).
47. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) provides:
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Second, plaintiff may proceed on a theory of disparate treatment. 9 As
the Supreme Court explained in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,5" the disparate treatment consists of "the employer simply
[treating] some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 5 ' The United States Supreme Court in-
itially articulated the burdens of proof required in a discriminatory treat-
ment case under Title VII in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. " The
plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she belongs to a racial minority, or
is otherwise a member of a protected class; (2) he or she applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
despite the qualifications, he or she Xvas rejected; and (4) after complainant's
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 3 If the plaintiff
meets this burden, the defendant then-must articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the complainant's rejection. Unless the plaintiff
thereafter is able to prove that the defendant's proffered reason was mere
pretext, and that the act complained of was discriminatory under Title VII,
the defendant will prevail. 4  The Court explained in International
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quan-
tity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, pro-
vided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of
sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to
employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions
of [the Equal Pay Act].
See Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1980) (airline's
policy requiring commencement of leave upon pregnancy was justified by safety considera-
tions); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976) (board of education's
seniority system based upon concept of "last hired-first fired" does not constitute unlawful
discrimination).
48. For example, exemptions exist for certain religious organizations and institutions of
higher learning. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l, 2000e-2(e) (1976).
49. The phrase disparate treatment is synonymous with discriminatory treatment.
50. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
51. Id. at 335 n.15.
52. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
53. Id. at 802. The Court added: "[Tihe facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and
the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
54. Id. at 804. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the
Court stated:
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be understood in
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Brotherhood of Teamsters" that in a discriminatory treatment case, proof
of discriminatory motive is'critical. 6 The Illinois courts have adopted both
the McDonnell and International Brotherhood of Teamsters mandates in
disparate treatment cases."7
Third, a plaintiff may proceed on an adverse impact theory." In Griggs
v. Duke Power Company,"' the United States Supreme Court held that Title
VII prohibits not merely purposeful discrimination but also employment
practices which appear to be neutral but which operate to exclude a protected
class and which cannot be shown to be related to job performance.6 0 In
light of the plaintiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff ....
... [T]he [plaintiff's] prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors" ....
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption
of discrimination .... The defendant need not persuade the court that it was ac-
tually motivated by the proffered reasons....
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion . . . that the proffered reason was
not the true reason for the employment decision.
Id. at 253-56 (citations omitted).
The burden of proving pretext is generally onerous and difficult to satisfy in the case of a
single plaintiff. Commentators have noted: "[Slince there is virtually no employee for whom an
employer cannot find a valid, objective reason for discharge, the employee will find it extremely
difficult to show that the reason given was 'pretextual' unless the employee focuses on employ-
ment patterns broader than his individual case." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 512.
The Court in McDonnell Douglas outlined several types of evidence that might be relevant in a
pretext case. This evidence includes facts concerning defendant's treatment of the plaintiff
prior to the act complained of and defendant's general policy and record of dealing with other
members of protected classes, including statistical evidence of any general pattern of
discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1977).
55. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
56. Id. at 335 n.15, See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Alexander v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 83 III. App. 3d
388, 403 N.E.2d 1271 (4th Dist. 1980) (school board held to have refused improperly to renew
contract of teacher who had filed a complaint with the commission); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 83 Ill. App. 3d 215, 403 N.E.2d 1224 (2d Dist. 1980)
(corporate employer has the burden of proving that its recruitment area was reasonable and in
compliance with the Fair Employment Practices Act).
58. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1158-97. Adverse impact, disproportionate
impact, disparate impact, and differential impact are used synonymously to describe practices,
which as a matter of empirical fact, operate to the disadvantage of protected classes. For ex-
ample, consider the employment practice of hiring only persons weighing more than 150
pounds. Although the employment practice would be facially neutral, and the employer probably
adopted the qualification for a nondiscriminatory reason, such a qualification probably
operates to exclude women disproportionately from the employer's work force. Thus, the
qualification may constitute adverse impact discrimination.
59. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60. Id. at 431. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n,
49 III. App. 3d 796, 365 N.E.2d 535 (1st Dist. 1977) (discharge of employee charged with theft
and subsequent refusal to rehire him after acquittal found to be racially discriminatory);
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other words, employment practices not shown to be a business necessity
which have a disproportionate impact on a protected class may be unlawful.
Additionally, Griggs stated that "good intent or the absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds'. . . . Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation."'" Thus, unlike a constitutional challenge against a statute
which results in a disproportionate impact, 2 proof of discriminatory pur-
pose is not required in a statutory case that proceeds on an adverse impact
theory.
Accordingly, statistical proof is particularly important in establishing
unlawful discrimination."3 Under the adverse impact theory, the plaintiff
must produce data comparing the success rates of the persons the employ-
ment practice allegedly disadvantaged with those of a control group. If the
protected class is disadvantaged at a substantially higher rate" than the con-
Chicago-Allis Mfg. Corp. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 32 I11. App. 3d 392, 336
N.E.2d 40 (1st Dist. 1975) (fact that black employee was fired after he engaged in a fight with
his white supervisor on company premises was not basis for finding company guilty of racial
discrimination).
61. 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
62. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
63. In cases of disparate treatment, statistical evidence may be probative of the
discriminatory motive which plaintiff must prove. The Court in Castaneda v. Partid, 430 U.S.
482 (1977) explained: "If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely
to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that
racial or other class-related factors entered into the selection process." Id. at 494 n.13.
Moreover, in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court supported this
conclusion stating:
[W]e know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a
totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not
the employer . . . based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as
race.
Id. at 577.
64. Griggs did not define the quantum of disparity required to establish a prima facie case
and this question remains unanswered. The Griggs Court gave deference to the EEOC's
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1981), which
define adverse impact as "[a) selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate." 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971). The EEOC, however, promulgated exceptions to this general rule. For example, the
rule is not applicable "where the differences are based on small numbers and are not
statistically significant, or where special recruiting or other programs cause the pool of minority or
female candidates to be atypical of the normal pool of applicants from that group." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D) (1981).
It is also unclear what constitutes the proper source of statistics (i.e., general population
data, the employer's work force, the relevant geographic area or work force from which a
statistical sample may be drawn, and the proper time span from which the sample may be
drawn). Accumulating statistical proof of discrimination is the subject of numerous treatises
and articles. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980 & Supp.
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trol group, the plaintiff has made a prima facie case. Once plaintiff has
established a sufficient disparate impact, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant either to rebut the plaintiff's statistical case or to prove that the Act
authorizes the practices complained of or makes them otherwise defensible.65
Having provided a general overview of employment discrimination law, the
remainder of this Article will discuss the law applicable to each class of persons
protected from unlawful employment discrimination under the Illinois Con-
stitution and the Human Rights Act.
RACE, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AND ALIENAGE
In Illinois, a variety of constitutional and statutory provisions prohibit
employment discrimination based on race, national origin, or alienage. The
Illinois courts regularly state that classifications based upon race, national
origin, and alienage are suspect classifications under the state constitution."
Because statutes or acts premised on these classifications must withstand a
strict judicial scrutiny, they are seldom able to survive.'
A recent case involving alienage is illustrative of this strict judicial review.
In People ex rel. Kenneth Holland v. Bleigh Construction Company,68 the
Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a state statute which favored resident
citizens over resident aliens for employment on public works projects. The
1981); F. MORRIS, CURRENT TRENDS IN THE USE (AND MISUSE) OF STATISTICS IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION (2d ed. 1978); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 65-184.
65. Perhaps the clearest statement of the defendant's burden in an adverse impact case is
found in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In considering whether the use
of a standardized test as an employee selection device was racially discriminatory, the Court
stated:
"[Tlhe burden of showing that any given requirement has . . . a manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question" [is on defendant]. This burden arises, of
course, only after the complaining party or class has made out a prima facie case
of discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select applicants for
hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool
of applicants. If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests
are "job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that other
tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also
serve the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship."
Id. at 425 (citations omitted).
66. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for the constitutional provisions concerning
discrimination. See also Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 III. 2d 116, 119, 412
N.E.2d 151, 152 (1980) (although race, alienage, and national origin are suspect classifications,
wealth based classifications are not suspect); People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61
Ill. 2d 258, 263, 335 N.E.2d 469, 473 (1975) (aliens as a class constitute a "discrete and in-
sular" minority); People v. Ellis, 57 I1. 2d 127, 131-32, 311 N.E.2d 98, 100 (1974) (in Illinois,
race, national ancestry are suspect classifications).
67. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 535
(1978 & Supp. 1979) (since 1945, no classification based on race or national origin has been
upheld when there was any possibility that it would burden racial minorities). See also supra
text accompanying notes 24-29.
68. 61 111. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975).
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court determined that the state's interest-"the desire . . . that its funds be
used to help those of its citizens who have paid taxes for at least a year, to
find employment" -was not compelling. 9 Similarly, distinctions based
upon race or national origin are equally uncompelling and it is unlikely that
such distinctions would withstand strict scrutiny.
Article I, section 17 of the Illinois Constitution also expressly prohibits
an employer from discriminating on the basis of race or national ancestry.
Unlike the equal protection or due process clauses, section 17 governs an
employer's actions regardless of whether state action is involved. 71 In this
regard, the reach of the Illinois Constitution is far greater than is generally
the case with the United States Constitution, which requires state action.7'
Similarly, the Human Rights Act prohibits race or national origin
discrimination.72 To date, there has been no case law interpreting this provi-
sion of the Act. Prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act, however,
Illinois courts applied the theories of discrimination recognized by the
federal courts under Title VII.7 Because of the similarity between the
Human Rights Act and Title VII there is no reason to believe that the state
courts will give the Act an interpretation different from previous state
statutes or different from the federal courts' interpretation of Title VII.
69. Id. at 262, 335 N.E.2d at 473. The court relied upon United States Supreme Court
precedent stating that: "[tlhe holding of [Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) and
[Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)] is that a classification based on citizenship is
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny, and that the State has the burden of showing that
the statute is narrowly drawn to achieve compelling State interest." 61 1ll.2d at 267, 335 N.E.2d
at 475.
Actually, the United States Supreme Court has not always strictly scrutinized classifications
based upon alienage. In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), the Court decided that a
state could deny employment as elementary and secondary school teachers to aliens who refused to
seek naturalization. Citing Sugarman and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), the Court in
Ambach clearly stated that there is an exception to the general rule that classifications based
on alienage are suspect. The exception applies to alien participation in governmental functions.
"[Slome state functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental en-
tity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons (aliens) who have not
become part of the process of self-government." 441 U.S. at 73-74. The Court concluded that
"school teachers may be regarded as performing a task 'that go[es] to the heart of represen-
tative government' . . . inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system .. " Id. at 75-76 (citation omitted). As a result of Foley and Am-
bach, if the challenged statute or act concerns a governmental function, classifications based
on alienage will be subjected to minimal scrutiny. See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
70. See VII SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1592-93
(1969-70). The Convention delegates recognized that the constitution's prohibition against
discrimination by private persons as well as by the state was "a departure from [the] historic
and traditional position." Id. at 1592. The Convention adopted this position because it was of
the opinion that merely prohibiting governmental discrimination "wouldn't really accomplish a
job that we feel has to be accomplished." Id.
71. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(Q) (1981).
73. See supra notes 15 & 18.
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Thus, the three methods of proving discrimination cases under Title VII
also appear to exist under the Human Rights Act. '
Specifically, there is likely to be considerable litigation challenging
employment practices which are neutral on their face but which dispropor-
tionately result in disadvantage to racial or ethnic minorities. For example,
the first United States Supreme Court case involving Title VII involved an
employer's requirement that employees have a high school diploma and a
minimum score on a standardized test." Both requirements disqualified
more prospective black applicants than white applicants. The Court held
that if the employer fails to meet "the burden of showing that any given re-
quirement . . . [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in
question," an employment practice shown to have an adverse impact
violates Title VII. 6 Employment practices which often have raised the issue
of discriminatory impact involving race or national origin under Title VII
include height and weight requirements," experience prerequisites," and ar-
rest 9 or conviction records.8"
It is important to note that although the Human Rights Act significantly
does not change state law concerning discrimination based on race or national
origin, it does deviate from the Illinois Constitution in one important
respect. The Human Rights Act does not make discrimination on the basis
of alienage unlawful." Although employees who are aliens are protected in
74. See supra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
75. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
76. Id. at 432.
77. In League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 651 (C.D. Cal. 1976), a prima facie case of discrimination was established because
height and weight requirements for firefighters and policemen resulted in disparate impact on
Mexican-Americans.
78. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, Locals 14 & 15, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (requirement of 200 days ex-
perience for an operator's license held not justifiably job related to overcome prima facie case
of discrimination); Afro Am. Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974) (equal
protection clause violated when arbitrary service requirement for promotions was used to
enhance past discrimination practices).
79. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (employer
enjoined from inquiring into applicant's prior arrests when that practice had the effect of
discriminating against blacks), aff'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). The Human Rights Act ex-
pressly prohibits an employer from inquiring whether a job applicant has ever been arrested.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-103 (1981). In Cook County Police and Corrections Merit Bd. v. Il-
linois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 59 Il1. App. 3d 305, 376 N.E.2d 11 (1st Dist.
1978), a case involving an application for a corrections officer position, the court observed that
an "arrest record alone does not indicate guilt or disrespect." Id. at 309, 376 N.E.2d at 14.
The court noted that there is an important distinction between an arrest and conviction. That
is, "[aln applicant's conviction record may be considered as a factor in determining suitability
for a position, but it is not a basis for summary rejection. Id. at 310, 376 N.E.2d at 14-15.
80. In Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), the court held that a
railroad's absolute policy of refusing employment to persons convicted of crimes discriminated
against blacks and could not be justified under the business necessity defense.
81. Although the Illinois Human Rights Act secures for individuals freedom from various
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general under the Act from "unlawful discrimination" as the Act defines
that term, 2 they are not protected from discrimination based solely on their
lack of citizenship. 3 Effective July 1, 1982, however, Illinois state agencies
are required to include in their affirmative action status reports details on
the national origin of their employees and specific goals and methods for
increasing the numbers of alien employees."'
GENDER
Both the Human Rights Act8" and the Illinois Constitution86 make
employment discrimination on the basis of sex unlawful. In contrast to the
federal Constitution, which does not expressly forbid discrimination on the
basis of gender, article I, section 18 of the Illinois Constitution prohibits
the deprivation or abridgement of equal protection on the basis of sex."
Further, article I, section 17 specifically prohibits both public and private
employers from engaging in sex discrimination in "hiring and promotion
practices." 8 8 The Illinois Supreme Court, unlike the federal courts, 9 has
held that distinctions based upon sex are suspect and must withstand strict
scrutiny. 90 As a result, the state courts do not defer to legislation which
types of discrimination, see supra note 1, there is no mention of discrimination based on
alienage in the Act. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to 9-102 (1981).
82. Unlawful discrimination is defined under the Act as "discrimination against a person
because of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status,
handicap or unfavorable discharge from the military service. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68,
§ 1-102(Q) (1981).
83. Neither Title VII nor the Illinois Human Rights Act expressly proscribes discrimination
based upon alienage. Analogizing Title VII case law to interpret the Human Rights Act,
discrimination based upon lack of citizenship is not violative of Title VII. See Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (Title VII is not violated when an employer refuses to hire
a person because he is not a United States citizen).
84. Act of Dec. 6, 1979, Pub. Act. No. 82-709, 1981 Il. Legis. Serv. 3427 (West) (to be
codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-105).
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(Q) (1981).
86. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 17, 18.
87. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 provides: "IT]he equal protection of the laws shall not be
denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school
districts."
88. Id. § 17.
89. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (classifications based on gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives); TRIBE, supra note 22, §§ 16-28 to 16-31, at 1074-92.
90. See People v. Grammer, 62 11. 2d 393, 342 N.E.2d 371 (1976) (a classification based
on sex must withstand strict judicial scrutiny under the 1970 Illinois Constitution); People v.
Ellis, 57 III. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974) (classifications based on sex are suspect and must be
founded on a compelling state purpose).
Despite these decisions and the specific constitutional ban on sex discrimination, the court in
Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 III. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 855 (4th Dist. 1979),
found that a public school's girls-only volleyball team was constitutionally permissible although
the school did not sponsor a boys' volleyball team. The Petrie court purported to follow Ellis,
which held that classifications based on gender must survive strict scrutiny, but nevertheless
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creates gender-based distinctions. Rather, sex-based classifications generally
are found unconstitutional. Strict scrutiny of gender-based classifications is
consistent with the explicit language of the constitution and its history. The
delegates to the constitutional convention introduced section 18 to ensure
that Illinois courts would apply strict scrutiny as opposed to the federal
courts' standard of an intermediate level of scrutiny when examining sex-
based classifications.'
The Human Rights Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex
which the Act defines as "the status of being male or female." 92 Thus, it is
clear that employment practices which treat either men or women differently
are unlawful93 unless a statutory defense is available.9" Further, employment
proceeded to apply a much less exacting standard to the challenged program classification. Id.
at 989, 394 N.E.2d at 862. The Petrie decision is not reconcilable with Ellis. Id. at 994-96, 394
N.E.2d at 865-67 (Craven, J., dissenting). Since Ellis, the Illinois Supreme Court has not
further elucidated the meaning of strict scrutiny as applied to gender classifications. However,
the court restated the Ellis rule in Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n,
81 111. 2d 136, 143, 407 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1980).
It should be noted that article I, § 2 of the Illinois Constitution, which states that "[n]o per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the
equal protection of the laws," also provides protection from gender-based discrimination.
Under this constitutional provision, however, gender-based classifications are not strictly
scrutinized. Rather, a classification analyzed under § 2 will be upheld if it bears a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate purpose that the classification is designed to serve. People v. Grammer,
62 Ill. 2d 393, 400, 342 N.E.2d 371, 375 (1976).
91. Some of the delegates to the constitutional convention who opposed the inclusion of
§ 18 argued that art. 1, § 2 adequately prohibited sex discrimination. Proponents of § 18,
however, were cognizant of the varying standards of review the federal courts use to evaluate
state classifications under the equal protection clause. Therefore, they introduced and urged
the passage of § 18 to ensure that gender-based classifications would be strictly srutinized.
V SIXTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 3669-77 (1969-70). The Illinois
Supreme Court has often repeated that the court's primary objective when interpreting the con-
stitution is to give effect to the intent of the framers. See People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane,
13 III. 2d 520, 532, 50 N.E.2d 168, 175 (1958). Therefore, the judicial adoption of strict
scrutiny in both constitutional and statutorily based gender discrimination cases is appropriate.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(Q) (1981).
93. In City of Chicago v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 87 I11. App. 3d 597,
410 N.E.2d 136 (1st Dist. 1980), a sex-segregated job classification system for custodians which
resulted in lower wages paid to women was held to constitute sex discrimination in violation of
the Fair Employment Practices Act, 1961 Ill. Laws 1845, repealed by Illinois Human Rights
Act, Pub. Act. No. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 Ill. Laws 4854. See supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
94. Title VII recognizes that sex may be a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of a particular enterprise. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976). See Uniform Guidelines of Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1981) (EEOC rules for determining whether a defense of bona fide occupa-
tional qualification may be invoked). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
(Title VII held to prohibit application of height and weight requirements for correctional
officers when such requirements were not bona fide occupational qualifications). Although the
Human Rights Act does not expressly provide that sex may be a bona fide occupational
qualification, it does provide for a general bona fide occupational qualification defense. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(A) (1981). Therefore, using federal case law, Illinois practitioners
might argue in appropriate cases that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification.
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practices which have a disproportionate impact upon women, such as lifting
requirements or minimum height and weight requirements, are unlawful
unless justified." Because both the Illinois Construction and the Human
Rights Act so clearly prohibit discrimination based upon the "status of being
male or female," gender discrimination cases concerning sex qua sex have
not been problematic. The same is not true of cases alleging discrimination
on the basis of a characteristic possessed solely by members of one sex,
such as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. It appears that under Illinois
law, discrimination against pregnant women is not considered gender-based
discrimination.96 A discussion of federal law will aid in understanding the
Illinois law.
In Geduldig v. Aiello," the United States Supreme Court considered a
California state disability insurance program which provided different
coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities than for other disabilities.98
Under the United States Constitution, discrimination on the basis of sex is
prohibited absent proof that the gender-based distinctions serve important
governmental objectives and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.99 The Court, finding no distinction based on gender in the
disability insurance program, explained:
[t]he lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender
becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential
recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members
of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue
to members of both sexes.' °
Having refused to recognize distinctions based upon pregnancy as "involv-
ing discrimination based on gender," the Court held the California program
constitutional.' Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court twice has cited
95. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court held that height
and weight requirements were not job related because such requirements bear an insufficient
relationship to strength, the characteristic essential to efficient performance as a correctional
officer.
96. See infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
97. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
98. Originally, the California statute defined disability to exclude all pregnancy-related
benefits. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Geduldig, however, a state court, following
the district court's opinion, held that the state plan did not preclude payment of benefits for
disability due to complications arising from pregnancy. The agency administering the state's
disability plan acquiesced in the decision. See Rentzer v. California Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973). Therefore, the narrow issue
before the Supreme Court in Geduldig was whether the state plan's failure to provide benefits
for normal pregnancies violated the Constitution.
99. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
100. 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974).
101. Id. at 497. Using a very deferential level of scrutiny, the Court decided that the state
plan's distinction between pregnancy and other state insured disabilities served a "legitimate
[state] interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program," and
"distributing the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate
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approvingly to Geduldig.'12 Although neither case held that pregnancy-
based discrimination was not gender based, it appears clear that this will be
the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion if called upon to decide this issue
under the Illinois Constitution.
10 3
Similarly, Illinois courts likely would hold that pregnancy-based
discrimination is not gender-based discrimination under the Human Rights
Act. An examination of federal law will justify this conclusion. In General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,'4 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from an employer's
disability plan constituted unlawful sex discrimination. Because Gilbert in-
volved a private employer, the action arose under Title VII. Under the Act,
it is unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individuals' . . . sex . . . ."I" The Act did not, at
that time, define "sex." Relying upon its reasoning in Geduldig, the Court
again concluded that pregnancy-based discrimination was not gender-based
discrimination and hence the challenged disability plan did not violate Title
VII. 106
Gilbert was particularly troublesome because the Court already had held
in Griggs that regardless of intent, an employment practice could be
level for the disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately." Id.
at 496.
102. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 81 111. 2d 136, 407
N.E.2d 539 (1980); Winks v. Board of Educ., 78 Ill. 2d 128, 398 N.E.2d 823 (1979).
103. In Winks v. Board of Educ., 78 Ill. 2d 128, 398 N.E.2d 823 (1979), the court upheld a
sick leave benefits plan which failed to provide benefits for normal pregnancy. This case was
decided on the narrow issue of statutory construction. The statute provided sick leave benefits
for personal illness. The court observed that because normal pregnancy was not an illness,
pregnant employees were not entitled to benefits under the statute. The court bolstered its opinion
with reference to the statute's use, in other sections, of the term temporary incapacity. When
this term was used elsewhere, the statute did not provide for leave. Id. at 136, 398 N.E.2d at
826. Although Winks was decided solely as a matter of statutory interpretation, the court
observed that "[this case] does not involve an equal protection issue. That issue was resolved
by the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello. Id. at 133, 398 N.E.2d at 825 (emphasis
added).
Similarly, in Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 81 Ill. 2d 136, 407
N.E.2d 539 (1980), the issue before the court was whether an employer's disability plan which
did not provide benefits for normal pregnancy violated the Fair Employment Practices Act,
1961 IIl. Laws 1845, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No. 81-1216, § 10-108,
1979 Ill. Laws 4854. In considering the statutory issue, the court observed that it was ap-
propriate to acknowledge the state constitution's prohibition of sex discrimination and the
decision in People v. Ellis, 57 I11. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974), subjecting gender-based
classifications to strict scrutiny. The court then concluded that "[tihe constitutional prohibition
of sex discrimination, however, does not require us to broaden the common meaning of
pregnancy." 81 111. 2d 136, 143, 407 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1980). The court then proceeded to treat
a distinction based on pregnancy as if it were not a distinction based on sex.
104. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
105. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
106. 429 U.S. 125, 134 (1976).
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unlawful under Title VII if it resulted in discriminatory impact, and was not
job related.10 7 The Griggs Court had stated that "Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation."' ' 08 It seemed entirely plausible, and to some a foregone
conclusion, that if an employment decision burdened pregnancy, it
necessarily had a discriminatory impact on women.' 9 The Gilbert Court,
however, concluded otherwise.
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Fair Employment Practices
Commission,' 10 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that it "agree[d] with the deci-
sion in Gilbert insofar as it held that the statutory provisions relied upon
were insufficient to support a finding of discrimination."''' The court's
dictum is significant in light of the legislative history of Title VII. When the
Court interpreted Title VII in Griggs, Title VII did not contain any defini-
tion of sex or gender; therefore, the statute was arguably open to differing
interpretation as to whether pregnancy discrimination equaled sex discrimi-
nation. Following the Gilbert decision, Congress amended Title VII to
define pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as gender-based
characteristics.''" When the Illinois legislature enacted the Human
Rights Act, however, it did not enact this broad federal definition. Rather,
the Human Rights Act defines sex for the purposes of the Act as "the
status of being male or female."" ' 3 Under the present language of the
Human Rights Act, the approach of Illinois Bell appears to be correct in
permitting pregnancy-based discrimination because discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy is not synonymous with discrimination on the basis of
"the status of being female."'"
HANDICAP
Handicapped persons are provided both constitutional and statutory pro-
tection from employment discrimination in Illinois."' The constitution pro-
hibits any employer from discriminating against persons with physical or
107. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See supra notes 59-61 and ac-
companying text.
108. 401 U.S. at 432.
109. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. 81 11. 2d 136, 407 N.E.2d 539 (1980).
111. Id. at 142-43, 407 N.E.2d at 541. In Illinois Bell, the Fair Employment Practices Com-
mission argued that the Illinois statute prohibited the denial of disability benefits for un-
complicated pregnancies because the state legislation was patterned after Title VII. Title VII
had been amended so that pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions were defined
as gender based characteristics. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. The court rejected
this argument because the congressional amendment to Title VII postdated Illinois Bell's
refusal to include pregnancy benefits in its benefits plan and this refusal was already pending
before the court. 81 III. 2d at 142, 407 N.E.2d at 541.
112. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-104(0) (1981).
114. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note I & 6 and accompanying text.
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mental handicaps if the discrimination is based on a handicap which is un-
related to that person's ability to perform a particular job.' 6
A major problem concerning the constitutional protection prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap has arisen because of the
constitution's failure to define the term handicap. An examination of the
transcript of the constitutional convention reveals that the delegates to that
convention were not clear as to the definition of handicap nor how broadly
or narrowly it should be interpreted." 7 As originally proposed to the con-
vention, the constitutional provision governing handicap discrimination
read: "[a]ll persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on
the basis of a physical or mental handicap in the hiring and promotion
practices of any employer . . Some convention delegates feared that
the language of this proposal might be interpreted as prohibiting discrimina-
tion against handicapped persons regardless of their ability."' Consequently,
the language was revised and finally approved to read: "[a]ll persons with
physical or mental handicaps shall be free from discrimination unrelated to
ability in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer."' 20
The lack of a definition is particularly troublesome when the alleged hand-
icap, such as cancer or a heart condition, is not universally acknowledged
to be a handicap. As a result, this ambiguity had produced a split among
the Illinois appellate courts. In Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co.,' 2 ' the first appellate court to confront this issue searched
the record of the constitutional convention, concluded that the convention
delegates had simply not agreed on what the term handicap meant, and
thereupon determined that it was obliged to utilize the ordinary and popular
meaning of the term.' 2 The court adopted the dictionary definition of hand-
icap: "a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult, esp.: a
physical disability that limits the capacity to work."' 23 The court further
decided that a determination of handicap depends upon whether the
disability is "generally perceived as one which severely limits the individual
in performing work related functions."'2 " Based on this definition, the
116. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
117. V SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 3678-89
(1970).
118. Id. at 3678.
119. Id. at 3678-80.
120. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
121. 67 I11. App. 3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1st Dist. 1978).
122. Id. at 515, 385 N.E.2d at 42.
123. Id. at 516, 385 N.E.2d at 43 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 1027 (17th ed. 1976)).
124. 67 Ill. App. 3d at 517, 385 N.E.2d at 44. In reaching this conclusion, the court
specifically rejected plaintiff's contention that "[i]f an emlloyee's illness or defect makes it
more difficult ... to find work . . . then it certainly operates to make achievement unusually
difficult [and that an employer's refusal to hire a person] . . . because of his illness is a classic
example of how such illness operates as a handicap." Id. (quoting Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Wisconsin, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 433 (1974)).
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court concluded that the plaintiff, who had been denied employment
because he had received a kidney transplant,' 25 did not possess a disability
"of the nature which falls within the commonly understood meaning of the
term 'physical handicap.' "I26
In contrast, the Fourth District Appellate Court of Illinois found cancer
to be a handicap in Lyons v. Heritage House Enterprises.'2 The Lyons
court adopted the definition of handicap contained in the Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because it found the purpose of the state and
federal statutes to be identical.' 28 The federal Act defines a handicapped in-
dividual as one "who has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, has a record
of such impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment."' 29
The Illinois Supreme Court granted review of Lyons to resolve the con-
flict between the lower courts. The supreme court reversed Lyons and held
that although the plaintiff allegedly was terminated solely because of her
cancer and the cancer did not affect her ability to perform her job, cancer
was not deemed a handicap. Therefore, her termination did not violate the
Illinois Constitution. 3 '
The Illinois Supreme Court defined handicap as "a class of physical and
mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers
upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions."' 3 ' The
125. The plaintiff was refused employment because the employer believed his condition
rendered him an unacceptable insurance risk under the employer's self insurance program. The
employer did not contend that the plaintiff was unqualified or unable to perform the job for
which he had applied. 67 I1. App. 3d at 513, 385 N.E.2d at 41.
126. Id. at 518, 385 N.E.2d at 44. It is not clear whether the court decided that the plaintiff
was not handicapped because his "only physical impairment ... [was] that he [was] restricted
from lifting heavy weights" or because the court believed kidney transplant recipients are not
commonly perceived as being severely limited in terms of job performance. Id. Accord Kubik
v. CNA Fin. Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1981) (court applied Ad-
vocates definition in holding that an employee who had lost his job after the removal of a
malignant tumor was not within the handicap definition), petition for leave to appeal denied,
No. 55,242 (March 30, 1982). In Kubik, the Court's decision appeared to be based upon its
conclusion that the plaintiff was not disabled, rather than that his physical handicap was one
not generally believed to impose severe barriers on one's ability to perform major life func-
tions.
127. 92 Ill. App. 3d 668, 415 N.E.2d 1341 (4th Dist. 1981). In Lyons, the plaintiff alleged
that she had been discharged shortly after having informed her employer that she had been
diagnosed as having cancer of the uterus.
128. Id. at 673, 415 N.E.2d at 1345. In reaching its conclusion, the Lyons court did not
distinguish the meaning of the term handicap for the purpose of a constitutional claim and its
meaning for the purpose of a statutory claim. In fact, the Lyons court's conclusion is based
entirely upon statutory construction and interpretation. Nevertheless, because the issue on ap-
peal was whether the lower courts properly had dismissed a complaint alleging a violation of
both the statute and the constitution, the decision by the court of appeals was based implicitly
upon a constitutional construction.
129. Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
130. Lyons v. Heritage House Enter., 89 Ill. 2d 163, 171, 432 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1981).
131. Id. at 168, 432 N.E.2d at 273 (quoting Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 67 II. App. 3d 512, 516-17, 385 N.E.2d 39, 43 (1st Dist. 1978)).
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court noted that the definition referred to "physical characteristics that im-
pede normal everyday life, rather than to any medical condition or
illness."' 32 When defining life activities, the court referred to state and
federal guidelines.' 33 The state guidelines define life activities to include
"communication, self care, socialization, education, employment, transpor-
tation, and the like.""'3 The United States Department of Health and
Human Services defines life activities to include activities such as "caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.""'3 Because the plaintiff had not alleged
that her cancer substantially hindered her "life activities" and because she
had failed to allege that her employer "perceived her condition as causing
such a hindrance," the court summarily concluded that she was not hand-
icapped. 3 6
The problem with the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis in Lyons is three-
fold. First, the court ignored the constitution's legislative history. Although
it is true that no official committee reports exist and that the delegates
never carefully determined the scope of the term "physical or mental han-
dicap,"' 37 this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the constitu-
tional history fails to delineate who the delegates intended to protect under
article I, section 19. In addition to such obvious handicaps as blindness and
amputated limbs, delegates who spoke on behalf of the constitutional provi-
sion indicated that they believed impediments such as epilepsy and
hemophelia were handicaps.' 3' Nevertheless, the Lyons court was of the
opinion that the "personal views" of the delegates who spoke on the issue
were not to be given controlling weight.' This conclusion is an unobjec-
tionable generalization; yet, the court disregarded this constitutional history
and proceeded to create a distinction never even mentioned at the constitu-
tional convention.
Further, to the extent that the court relied on case law from other
jurisdictions in support of its distinction between physical conditions and
medical conditions or illnesses, such reliance appears to be misplaced.' ° For
132. 89 I11. 2d at 168, 432 N.E.2d at 274. In addition to defining handicap for the purpose
of a constitutional claim, the court also interpreted the term handicap for the purposes of the
Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act. However, because the Human Rights Act's
definition of handicap has superseded the handicap Act's definition, the case is generally
without precedential value when interpreting the Human Rights Act. See infra note 149-50 and
accompanying text.
133. 89 Il1. 2d at 168-70, 432 N.E.2d at 274.
134. Id. at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 274.
135. 45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)(2)(iii) (1980).
136. 89 I11. 2d at 170-71, 432 N.E.2d at 274.
137. See V SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 3678-85
(1970).
138. Id.
139. 89 Ill. 2d at 166, 432 N.E.2d at 272.
140. Id. at 168-69, 432 N.E.2d at 273. It is not clear what authority the court relied upon in
creating the distinction between physical and medical conditions. The only support mentioned
is the "ordinary understanding" of the terms involved and case law from other jurisdictions.
Id.
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example, the court cited American National Insurance Co. v. State of
California Fair Employment Practice Commission"' in which the California
court held that discrimination based on high blood pressure did not con-
stitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of a physical handicap. Unlike
the Illinois Constitution, the California statute not only defined the terms
physical handicap" 2 and medical condition but also distinguished the two
terms." 3 It was clear from these definitions that high blood pressure was a
medical condition, and accordingly, the California case was properly decided.
Because of the substantial difference between the constitutional language in
Illinois and the California statutory language, the California opinion should
have provided little if any assistance to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Second, the Lyons court was of the opinion that "not all abnormal
physical conditions are handicaps. . . . [Some] cannot be considered a sub-
stantial limitation on activity.""' The court held, in part, that the plaintiff
was not handicapped because she had not alleged that her cancer substan-
tially hindered her work or other "life activities. '"" ' Yet, if the plaintiff
had alleged that her cancer hindered her work ability, she still would not
have prevailed in a constitutional case. The constitution does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of diminished ability; rather it prohibits discrim-
ination on the basis of those handicaps unrelated to ability. Further, the
delegates did not distinguish severe or substantial handicaps from other
types of handicaps. During the constitutional debate, the chief sponsor of
the proposed constitutional language explained that the prohibitory lang-
uage meant "you just can't deny a person [a job] because he walks in the
door[with a handicap]. . . .If he cannot perform the job or does not have
the ability, then you can deny the person [a job]. " The Lyons court,
therefore, placed the handicapped in an untenable position. The Illinois
Constitution protects the handicapped from employment discrimination to
the extent that person can perform the job. The Lyons court, in contrast,
only protected those persons who were substantially limited by the han-
dicap.
A third troubling aspect of Lyons is the Illinois Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that the plaintiff failed to allege that her employer perceived her condition
141. 170 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1981).
142. Id. at 888. The statute involved provided: " 'Physical handicap' includes impairment of
sight, hearing, or speech, or impairment of physical ability because of amputation or loss of
function or coordination, or any other health impairment which requires special education or
related services." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413 (West Supp. 1975), amended by CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12926 (West Supp. 1982).
143. A medical condition was defined statutorily as "any health impairment for which a
person has been rehabilitated or cured." 170 Cal. Rptr. at 890. The American National court
reasoned that a medical condition involves a lesser impairment of function than a handicap.
Moreover, the handicapped person usually requires rehabilitation to attain employability. Id. at
888-89.
144. 89 111. 2d at 169, 432 N.E.2d at 273.
145. Id. at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 274.
146. V SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 3679 (1970).
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as hindering major life functions. The lower court found that the allegations in
the plaintiff's complaint supported the conclusion that the defendant con-
sidered plaintiff's physical condition to be a physical handicap and that this
controlled the defendant's decision to terminate her.'4 7 Requiring a plaintiff
to show that the employer believed the handicap hinders major life func-
tions, in addition to requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer dis-
criminated in a manner not related to job ability because of the handicap,
places more of a burden upon the plaintiff than it appears the constitution's
framers intended. 148
Unlike the constitution, the Human Rights Act provides a definition of
handicap. The Act defines handicap as:
a determinable physical or mental characteristic of a person, the history of
such characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the person
complained against, which may result from disease, injury, congenital
condition of birth or functional disorder and which characteristic ...is
unrelated to the person's ability to perform the duties of a particular job
or position.' 4
9
The present statutory definition is so clear and broad that it effectively
supercedes the Lyons definition of handicap insofar as this case might have
controlled the definition of handicap under the statute. The current
statutory definition of handicap virtually is identical to the one contained in
the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.' 5
To date, Illinois case law on the subject of handicap discrimination in
employment has been confined to determining which physical and mental
conditions are protected under the constitution or statute. Many more com-
plex issues such as when and to what extent an employer must accom-
modate an employee's handicap have arisen under the federal laws and may
be expected to eventually confront the Illinois courts.''
RELIGION
Although the Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on religion,' 2
147. Lyons v. Heritage House Enter., 92 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672-74, 415 N.E.2d 1341, 1345
(4th Dist. 1981).
148. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. See also S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 64 (1973).
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I)(1) (1981).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29. The federal legislative history reveals con-
gressional thinking on why the definition must be so broad and inclusive. See S. REP. No.
1296, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 49-58 (1973) (Congress distressed to discover that handicapped in-
dividuals most in need of services are usually the last to receive them).
151. Expected issues include: (1) whether an employer must accommodate an employee's
handicap, and, if so, to what extent; (2) what constitutes a handicapped person who is other-
wise qualified; and (3) what is the role of safety as a defense in handicap cases. See A. LAR-
SON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (perm. rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
152. The Human Rights Act defines religion as "any belief protected by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(N)
(1981). The United States Supreme Court has defined religion quite expansively for the pur-
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the establishment' 3 and free exercise'" clauses of both the federal and state
constitutions severely limit the extent to which the state may legislate matters
related to religion. In recognition of this, the Illinois legislature narrowed the
scope of the Act's applicability. The Act's definition of an employer excludes
any religious organization such as a parochial school.'" Although a religious
organization/employer is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion, it
is not permitted to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin,
gender, or other protected classes." 6 Thus, the state partially has avoided
involvement in the hiring and firing decisions of religious organizations,
thereby avoiding conflicts that would arise under the free exercise clause of
the state and federal constitutions.
There also is a limitation on the extent to which the Human Rights Act
may force nonreligious-affiliated employers to accommodate employees'
religious needs. This limitation prevents the state from forcing an employer
to comply with employees' religious demands to such an extent that the
state may be accused of contributing to the establishment of a religion. In
Olin v. Fair Employment Practices Commission,"' the Illinois Supreme
Court relied upon a case which arose under Title VII, Trans World Airlines
poses of the free exercise clause. Religion includes, but is not limited to, theistic concepts or
traditional religious beliefs. See Torcasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). The Court has
held that a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God" of those persons with traditional religious beliefs is entitled
to protection as a religious belief. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). Religious
belief need not be commonly acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible and the
"guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of
a religious sect." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981). However, not all per-
sonal or philosophical beliefs rise to the level of religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-16 (1972). Mere personal or social beliefs are beyond constitutional protection. See
Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 506-07 (4th Cir. 1974).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. 1; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. I; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
155. The Human Rights Act specifically excludes:
[Alny religious corporation, association, educational institution, society, or non-
profit nursing institution conducted by and for those who rely upon treatment by
prayer through spiritual means in accordance with the tenets of a recognized
church or religious denomination with respect to the employment of individuals of
a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such cor-
poration, association, educational institution, society or non-profit nursing institu-
tion of its activities.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68 § 2-101(B)(2) (1981).
The Illinois statutory definition is considerably narrower when conduct or practices dictated
or forbidden by a religious belief are involved. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 674 (1980).
156. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68 § 2-101(B)(2) (1981) (religious organizations excluded
from statutory definition of employer) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68 § 1-103(Q) (1981) (identify-
ing unlawful areas of discrimination outside employment content).
157. 67 Ill. 2d 466, 367 N.E.2d 1267 (1977). Olin was decided under the Fair Employment
Practices Act, 1961 Ill. Laws 1845, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No.
81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 Ill. Laws 4854.
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v. Hardison,"' to determine the extent to which an employer must accom-
modate an employee's religious needs to avoid discriminating on the basis
of religion. In Olin, an employee's religious beliefs prohibited him from
working on the Sabbath. The employee volunteered three arrangements
which would have satisfied his religious needs. He offered to work at other
times to compensate for his loss of work time, to obtain a substitute to
work in his stead on the Sabbath, or to work merely four days each week.
The employer rejected the first and third proposals because either would
result in an insufficient number of laborers working. The second option
also was rejected because it would have required the employer to pay the
substitute employee a premium weekend wage unless plaintiff and another
employee traded shifts. Furthermore, the union would not have consented
to the second option because such a trade would violate the seniority provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement.'"
The Olin court held that Olin could not have made an accommodation to
the religious beliefs of one of its employees without undue hardship to its
business. Nevertheless, in reversing the Fair Employment Practice Commis-
sion's decision that Olin reasonably could have accommodated the plaintiff,
the Olin court unmistakably followed the Hardison rationale and cited the
Hardison rule that more than a de minimis cost is an undue hardship. 6 In
reaching its conclusion, the Olin court accepted the Hardison balancing of
the plaintiff's interest in the free exercise of religious beliefs against the in-
terests of co-employees, the interests of collective bargaining agreements,
and the employer's interests.' 6 ' Because the plaintiff was unable to secure a
voluntary replacement to work on the Sabbath,' 2 the employer could have
accommodated the plaintiff's work preference only by subordinating the
preferences of other employees. As between the only two alternatives for
apportioning weekend work-a neutral system based on seniority or
rotating shifts, or a system which paid explicit attention to the religious
needs of employees-only the latter would fully satisfy the workers who
had religious-based preferences. Satisfaction of the religious needs of some
employees would require other employees with perhaps as equally strong
nonreligious reasons for not working on the Sabbath to subordinate their in-
terests to those employees with religious beliefs. Such subordination would
158. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). The facts in Hardison are strikingly similar to the facts in Olin. In
Hardison, as in Olin, the employee whose religious beliefs precluded working on his Sabbath
suggested three alternative work arrangements. Mr. Hardison's offer to work a four day week
was rejected by TWA because the plaintiff's department would have been left understaffed. Id.
at 68. Mr. Hardison offered to trade jobs with another employee but the union refused to per-
mit any such violation of the contract's seniority provisions. Id. at 78. Finally, Mr. Hardison
suggested TWA simply could have assigned another person to perform his job on the Sabbath.
TWA rejected this proposal because it would have required premium overtime pay for any
such replacement. Id. at 76.
159. 67 II. 2d 466, 469-71, 367 N.W.2d 1267, 1268-69 (1977).
160. Id. at 479, 367 N.E.2d at 1273.
161. Id. at 476-78, 367 N.E.2d at 1272-73.
162. Id. at 479, 367 N.E.2d at 1272.
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constitute unequal treatment on the basis of religion. 6 3 In short, any ac-
commodation that would have subrogated the terms of a seniority system or
have deprived co-employees of their contractual rights also would have
subordinated the interests of employees without religious needs to those
employees with such needs. " '
Olin also considered the cost of accommodation to the employer and the
employee's statutory right not to be discriminated against because of
religion. The Olin case could be criticized, as was Hardison, on the basis
that the monetary cost of paying overtime for an employee's replacement is
relatively miniscule for a large employer like the Olin Corporation.' 65
Accordingly, critics could assert that Olin has misapplied its own rule that
an employer only need bear a de minimis cost to accommodate religious
needs of employees. Such criticism is misplaced for two reasons.
First, the term de minimis is not synonymous with anything less than a
large amount. The term's legal definition is: de minimis non curat lex-the
law does not care about trifles. 66 Accordingly, if something is de minimis,
the law simply will not recognize it. 67 Only a legally insignificant accommo-
dation by an employer for an employee's religious needs is necessary.'
68
163. Id. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 80-81 (1977) (in dismissing plain-
tiff's complaint against defendant airline, the Court held that an accommodation of plaintiff's
religious beliefs would result in discrimination against other employees through disruption of
the seniority system and compelled schedule transfers).
164. Id. at 81-82. The Hardison Court characterized the seniority system as a "significant
accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular, of all of [the] employees." Id. at 78.
The Court characterized as fundamental the proposition that the nondiscrimination mandate of
Title VII "does not require an employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority system to
deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee's
religious practices." Id. at 83 n.14.
Bona fide seniority systems have been accorded particular protections by Title VII and
courts interpreting the Act. See United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559-60 (1977)
(disparities due to bona fide seniority system allowed if these disparities were not the result of
intentional discrimination); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1972) (routine application of a bona fide seniority system held not unlawful under Title VII).
See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (it is permissible to apply dif-
ferent standards pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system).
165. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 92 n.6 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissen-
ting). See also LARSON, supra note 151, at § 92.24, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 70, 272-74 (1977).
166. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 388 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
167. [Tlhe corollary of the maxim is that "de minimis," used by itself means some-
thing so small that the law simply does not take cognizance of it; in other words,
for legal purposes, it does not exist at all. This is why the Supreme Court involved
de minimus rather than some quantitative expression of smallness. . . . Any pay-
ment which, if denied, is large enough. to be discrimination against [for example]
H, would be if granted to H, large enough to be discrimination against J.
Larson, supra note 151, at § 92.24.
168. See generally LARSON, supra note 151, at § 92.00; Comment, The Constitutionality of
an Employer's Duty to Accommodate Religious Beliefs and Practices, 56 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV.
635, 675 (1980).
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Therefore, because the accommodation the employee sought in this case
was sufficiently significant for the law to recognize, the court did not even
reach the question of whether it was a relatively small amount.' 9 In other
words, once the accommodation requested is legally significant, the compar-
ison between the cost of accommodation and the employer's ability to com-
ply is irrelevant.' 7 0
Second, the criticism fails to consider that if the Human Rights Act re-
quired more than de minimis accommodation for the religious beliefs of an
employee, that accommodation could present serious constitutional prob-
lems. Unfortunately, the Olin and Hardison courts failed to articulate any
constitutional arguments in support of their rule-accommodation. Conse-
quently, these courts failed to provide insight as to why they were constitu-
tionally required to construe the Human Rights Act and Title VII respec-
tively necessitating only de minimis accommodation.
The constitutional dilemma arising from the mandate that an employer
not discriminate on the basis of religion is that it may "establish" religion
in violation of the Illinois and federal constitutions. The United States
Supreme Court has established a three-prong test for determining violations
of the establishment clause. First, to comply with the establishment clause,
the legislation must have a secular purpose.' 7 ' The legislation in question
also must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion,' and finally its administration must avoid excessive government
entanglement with religion.'" If a statutory provision fails to meet any one
of the three prongs of the test, it is declared unconstitutional.',
An application of this three-prong test to the instant problem indicates
that a requirement that employers provide more than de minimis accommo-
dation for employees' religious needs could violate the first prong of the es-
tablishment clause. Using the legislative history of the analogous provisions
of Title VII, it could be argued that requiring more than de minimis accom-
modation provides protection for certain religions or religious beliefs and
169. 67 111. 2d 466, 475, 367 N.E.2d 1267, 1271.
170. Nevertheless, the EEOC has promulgated regulations which appear to reject the Har-
dison rule that only de minimis accommodations are necessary. These regulations suggest that
a de minimis cost only may be determined by balancing the identifiable cost of accommodation
against the size of the employer and the number of employees who the employer may need to
accommodate. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1)
(1981).
171. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1972).
172. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973).
173. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973); Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
174. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tax relief pro-
gram benefitting parents of non-public school children found to have the primary effect of
aiding religion because 8007o of the benefitted class were parents of parochial school children).
See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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practices.' The United States Supreme Court has found a violation of the
first amendment when religious beliefs are aided at the expense of nonreli-
gious beliefs or preferences.' 6 Title VII's protection arguably serves a
nonsecular purpose in violation of the first amendment. Nevertheless, some
courts have suggested that because Title VII (and by analogy the Human
Rights Act) has as a basis the secular purpose of prohibiting employment
discrimination generally, a secular purpose is served.' It appears that if a
court can identify a secular purpose served by the statute, the existence of a
nonsecular purpose will not suffice to invalidate it.'"
It also is arguable that the effect of the Human Rights Act's prohibition
against religious discrimination generally will be to promote religion in
175. It may be argued that Title VII, insofar as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of
religion, was enacted to advance certain specific religions. Consider, for example, the remarks
Senator Jennings Randolph made when he introduced the amendment to Title VII addressing
religious accommodation.
I am sure that my colleagues are well aware that there are several religious
bodies-we could call them religious sects; denominational in nature-not large in
membership but with certain strong convictions, that believe there should be a
steadfast observance of the Sabbath and require that observance of the day of wor-
ship, the day of the Sabbath, be other than on Sunday. . . . There are approx-
imately 750,000 men and women who are Othodox Jews in the U.S. work force
who fall in this category of persons I am discussing. There are an additional
425,000 men and women in the work force who are Seventh-day Adventists ...
[Tihere has been a partial refusal at times on the part of employers to hire or con-
tinue in employment employees whose religious practices rigidly require them to
abstain from work in the nature of hire on particular days. So there has been,
because of understandable pressures, such as commitments of a family nature and
otherwise, a dwindling of the membership of some of the religious organizations
because of the situation to which I have just directed attention ...
118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972).
176. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Court stated: "We repeat and . . .
reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally ... pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on dif-
ferent beliefs." Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted).
177. The district court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo.
1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), concluded
that Title VII had a secular purpose because it merely ensures that a person will not be
"discharged from his job merely because of his religion." Id. at 888. It also has been argued
that since Title VII does not provide "direct or financial support" to religious organizations,
the statute does not have a primary effect of advancing religion. The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 271 n.47 (1977).
178. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (Court re-
jected challenge to Massachusetts Sunday closing law brought by Orthodox Jews); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Court rejected challenge to Pennsylvania Sunday closing law
brought by Orthodox Jew clothing store owners); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (Court upheld conviction of department store employees for selling goods prohibited by
Maryland Sunday closing law intended to provide uniform day of rest). See also, TRIBE, supra
note 22, § 14-9, at 839-46.
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violation of the second prong of the establishment clause test. As the court
observed in Gavin v. People's Natural Gas Co.:'
It is clear from reviewing the cases that individuals of certain religious
beliefs have been benefitting under [Title VII] .... Parenthetically, we
would note that this may be because members of certain sects are more
knowledgeable of the law, or for any number of reasons. Eventually, the
protection of the act may spread to many others. However, it can only
spread to individuals who characterize their beliefs or convictions as
"religious". If one were an avid sports fan, one could not use that en-
thusiasm, however intense, to require an accommodation to one's desire
to attend a sports event.
Indeed, in a case like Olin, a work assignment system which prefers those
with religious needs over those without religious concerns advances religion
by rewarding those with religious beliefs.
Finally, the excessive entanglement prohibited by the Constitution can
take at least two forms: governmental involvement in ecclesiastical affairs'80
or excessive governmental surveillance of religious institutions or
personnel.' 8 ' Such entanglement would not be present in Olin because the
employer was not a religious organization. Although in the Olin situation
no violation of the third prong occurred, any requirement that an employer
provide more than de minimis accommodations for employees' religious
needs arguably violates the first and second prongs of the establishment
clause test.
In addition to the scheduling cases such as Olin, religious discrimination
also may be alleged in cases involving union membership and dues,"8 2 flag
179. 464 F. Supp. 622, 629-30 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated and remanded on procedural
grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980).
180. In McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972), the court refused to enforce Title VII's prohibition against sex-based discrimination
when the employee's duties were connected with the religious activities of a religious organiza-
tion. The court stated:
We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment rela-
tionship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its
minister, would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious
freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment.
Id. at 560.
181. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (state subsidies to
parochial schools for building maintenance and repair held an impermissible administrative en-
tanglement); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (providing reimburse-
ment for parochial school teacher prepared testing held an excessive entanglement); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (salary supplements to teachers an administrative entanglement
because they required continuing surveillance into functioning of parochial school).
182. Compare Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979) (employee
must attempt to accommodate his religious beliefs to employer's flexible dues requirement)
with Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer must show
good faith in requiring payment of union dues when the payment of dues is contrary to an em-
ployee's religious beliefs), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979) and McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc.,
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raising, '83 clothing preferences,'" services or tasks relating to objectionable
acts,' 5 and personal appearance.'" Following Olin, it appears that an
employee's religious beliefs need not be accommodated if such accommoda-
tion would accord other employees less preferential treatment or if the
terms of a bona fide seniority system would be affected. In the absence of
either of these factors, employers may have to incur de minimis costs to
accommodate employees' religious beliefs.' 7 Examples of accommodation
that would be appropriate include permitting voluntary substitutes and
swaps, flexible scheduling which would provide employees with a choice of
times during which they would not work, and systems permitting lateral
transfers and a change of job assignments.' 8
AGE
Age-based distinctions are neither expressly prohibited by the Illinois
Constitution nor suspect under the state or federal equal protection
clauses.' Consequently, employment policies or statutes based on age will
be subject to minimal scrutiny, and thus, upheld provided they are rationally
related to a legitimate public purpose."" The Human Rights Act, however,
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age.' 8 ' Unlike the
571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978) (when requiring dues employer must make reasonable attempt to
accommodate employee's religious beliefs).
183. In Gavin v. Peoples Nat'l Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622 (D.C. Pa. 1979), vacated and re-
manded on procedural grounds, 673 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980), the court recognized that requir-
ing an employer to accommodate an employee's religious disbelief in flag raising unconstitu-
tionally entangles the court with religion.
184. See, e.g., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 23 (1971) (Title VII violated when employer
refused to allow employee to wear the traditional garb characteristic of her Black Muslim
faith); 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 172 (1970) (hospital's refusal to allow nurse to wear
head covering in accordance with her religious beliefs violated Title VII).
185. See, e.g., Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1975) (termination
of employment due to belief that hospitals should perform abortions found unconstitutional).
186. See, e.g., Geller v. Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1976) (air force rule
which required a Jewish chaplin to remove his beard found unconstitutional).
187. Some accommodations, for example, permitting persons to wear certain clothing or
head coverings do not require any employer expenditures. It has been argued, however, that
"there may be the equivalent of a cost [if] unorthodox garb or hairstyle is perceived as damag-
ing the employer's business." LARSON, supra note 151, at § 92.41.
188. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d) (1981).
189. See supra notes 6 & 21.
190. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (a forced retirement rule that was
rationally related to the valid public purpose of favoring younger officers who may be more ef-
ficient and more capable of withstanding physical strain than older officers upheld);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (a rule requiring police of-
ficers to retire at age 50 upheld because it was found rationally related to the legitimate goal of
ensuring that police officers be physically prepared to meet the rigors of police work); Tavern
Owners Ass'n v. County of Lake, 52 Il. App. 3d 542, 547, 367 N.E.2d 748, 752 (2d Dist.
1977) (statute which prohibited persons under the age of 21 from working as bartenders was
upheld because rationally related to the goal of liquor control).
191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-103(Q), 2-102(A) (1.981).
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previous Illinois statute governing age discrimination which did not define a
protected class, 92 the Human Rights Act provides that persons forty years
old, but not yet seventy years old, are protected.' 93 Consistent with the
former act, the present statute exempts from its general prohibitions certain
executive employees 9 and merit and retirement systems "provided such
system or its administration is not used as a subterfuge for or does not have
the effect of unlawful discrimination."' 9
Only one case interprets the age provisions of the Human Rights Act,' 96
and judicial interpretation of the statute predating this Act also is sparse.197
In Board of Trustees v. Human Rights Commission,98 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the compulsory retirement of three tenured professors at
the age of sixty-five violated the Human Rights Act. Although compulsory
retirement was not expressly within the Act's definition of civil rights viola-
tions, the court determined that involuntary retirement on the basis of age
prior to the age of seventy could violate the Act.' 99 The court next con-
sidered whether the retirement system at issue was protected under section
2-104(E)(1). This provision states that it is not unlawful to apply "different
terms, conditions or privileges of employment pursuant to a merit or retire-
ment system provided that such system or its administration is not used as
subterfuge for or does not have the effect of unlawful discrimination. ''00
192. Fair Employment Practices Act, 1961 Ill. Laws 1845, repealed by Illinois Human
Rights Act, Pub. Act. No. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 I11. Laws 4854. Section 881, the legislative
declaration of this former Act, indicated that the class of persons the legislature intended to
protect was workers over 45 years of age. However, because the statute did not define age and
failed to state any age beyond which it was applicable, at least one court looked to the federal
law and other states' fair employment practices acts to ascertain the class that the legislature
intended to protect. See Kennedy v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 7, 23 I11. App. 3d 382,
319 N.E.2d 243 (4th Dist. 1974) (court concluded that the 45-65 age group appeared to be the
protected class).
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(A) (1981).
194. Id. § 2-104(E)(2).
195. Id. § 2-104(E)(1).
196. See Board of Trustees v. Human Rights Comm'n, 88 I11. 2d 22, 429 N.E.2d 1207
(1981). See infra text accompanying notes 198-203.
197. See Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 I11. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1976) (no right to a
civil action for damages under the prior statutory scheme); Kennedy v. Community School
Dist. No. 7, 23 111. App. 3d 382, 319 N.E.2d 243 (4th Dist. 1974) (compulsory state retirement
system found not to be a subterfuge to evade the Fair Employment Practices Act).
198. 88 II1. 2d 22, 429 N.E.2d 1207 (1981).
199. Id. at 29, 429 N.E.2d at 1211. In reaching this decision, the court noted that "[a]s
remedial legislation the Act should be construed liberally to effect its purpose." Id. at 26, 429
N.E.2d at 1209. The court further observed that the Human Rights Act contains a provision
expressly exempting the compulsory retirement of certain high-ranking executives at the age of
65. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(E)(2) (1981). If compulsory retirement had not been
considered a potential civil rights violation, that exemption would not have been necessary. 88
I11. 2d at 27-28, 429 N.E.2d at 1210.
200. 88 I11. 2d at 29, 429 N.E.2d at 1211. The court's holding in Board of Trustees appears to
have rejected the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District in Kennedy v. Communi-
ty School Dist. No. 7, 23 111. App. 3d 382, 319 N.E.2d 243 (4th Dist. 1974). In Kennedy,
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The court first rejected the defendant's contention that retirement itself is a
condition of employment and that retirement age is a term of any retire-
ment system. "It is not in the terms of the retirement system-the retire-
ment age, for example-that the complainants are treated differently than
others. Everyone must retire at the same age. The discrimination is in the
retirement itself." 2 ' Second, the employer's contention was tantamount to
an assertion that all existing retirement systems are exempt from complying
with the Act. The court, however, previously had rejected this
contention." 2 Finally, the court addressed the final phrase of section
2-104(E)(1) which only exempts a merit or retirement system which does
"not have the effect of unlawful discrimination." The court had no difficulty in
deciding that a system which mandated retirement solely on the basis of age
had the effect of unlawful age discrimination. 0 3
The Illinois Supreme Court's discussion of permissible age distinctions
the court considered whether a school board's involuntary retirement of a 65 year-old teacher
under a state retirement system was a subterfuge prohibited under the statute. Nevertheless, the
court did not appear to scrutinize the retirement system. It merely observed that the state had
"for many years ...provided a system for teachers' annuity and pension," that the system
had "general application to teachers throughout the state," and that the plaintiff "has long
qualified under the benefits of such annuity and pension system." Id. at 386, 319 N.E.2d at
247. The Kennedy court concluded that the state retirement system was not a subterfuge to
evade the statute and, accordingly, that the plaintiff's involuntary retirement did not violate
the Act. Id. at 386, 319 N.E.2d at 247.
To determine whether the system is a subterfuge for, or has the effect of, discrimination,
Board of Trustees indicates that a retirement system should be scrutinized more carefully than
the analysis in Kennedy suggests. In support of this approach, the court referred to United
Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1972), where the United States Supreme Court held that a
retirement plan which had been instituted in good faith prior to the passage of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976), could not be a subter-
fuge to avoid the purposes of the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the McMann
Court was construing different statutory language than that of the federal Act, and implied
that this justified the difference in results. Although the statutory language construed in the
two cases was not identical, their differences do not explain the different results obtained.
Specifically, the federal Act provides that it is not unlawful for an employer "to observe the
terms of a bona fide . . . system . . . such as a retirement . . . plan, which is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of this Act, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual. . . ." Id. at § 621(b). Shortly after McMann was decided, Cong-
ress amended the Act. The legislative history to this amendment clearly demonstrates that Con-
gress did not intend to exempt retirement or pension systems merely because they antedated the
Act. See CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON THE 1978 AMENDMENTS TO THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT, H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). Cf. Thompson v. Chrysler
Corp., 569 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1978) (retirement plan held not a subterfuge for age discrimina-
tion where pension policy followed retirement); Minton v. Whirlpool Corp., 569 F.2d 1012
(7th Cir. 1978) (discharge upheld because no finding of subterfuge in retirement plan); Hannan
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 443 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (bona fide retirement plan held
to be used in discriminatory manner when age was the only factor used in determining whether
a person was retired rather than laid off subject to recall).
201. 88 Il. 2d 22, 30, 429 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (1981).
202. See supra note 199.
203. 88 II1. 2d at 35, 429 N.E.2d at 1214.
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provides insight into how the court may decide future cases. The court ap-
pears to have created a balancing test to determine whether age differentials
in employer plans violate the Act. If the plan's discriminatory feature also
serves the purpose of assisting the older worker, it may be permissible. The
court provided the examples of provisions requiring greater contributions to
the pension fund from older workers and provisions providing different
benefits to employees based on age.2 '" Using these examples as a basis for
its discussion, the court said that
the focus in assessing whether a different standard is permitted . . . is on
the effects the system will have with the different standard incorporated
into it .... So long as ... their overall impact do[es] not turn the system
into one which favors or disfavors employees on the basis of age or any
other unlawful discrimination, the system does not run afoul .... 2o,
The court then observed that differential pension contributions and
health insurance coverage based on age were "not only fair and rational,
but also necessary to prevent the employer's obligation to hire without
regard to age from being undermined by the exorbitant cost of hiring older
people.' '206 In contrast, the problem with compulsory retirement is that it is
"neither necessary nor fair" and "has the effect so dramatic and arbitrary
that it must be considered unlawful discrimination." '2'
Because of this lack of precedent interpreting the Illinois law, practi-
tioners must look to the substantive provisions of the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act20° and Title V112 0 which are similar to
the provisions of the Illinois Act. Federal case law indicates that the order
and allocation of burdens of proof delineated in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green21' and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,21'
both Title VII cases, are applicable in federal age discrimination cases.2 12 It
generally has been held that a plaintiff need not prove discrimination in
favor of persons outside the protected class to succeed in an age discrimina-
tion case. 213 For example, a sixty-five-year-old person who is replaced by a
204. Id. at 33-34, 429 N.E.2d at 1213.
205. Id. at 33, 429 N.E.2d at 1213.
206. Id. at 34, 429 N.E.2d at 1213.
207. Id. at 34, 429 N.E.2d at 1214. The court's determination that compulsory retirement
was not necessary was, based partially upon the fact that many divisions of the state college
and university system operated without the requirement. Id.
208. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2C10e (1976) (Equal Employment Opportunities).
210. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
211. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
212. See Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1981) (the evidentiary burden is on
the employer to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence); Rodriquez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977) (burden on defendant to show
non-discriminatory motive).
213. In McCorstim v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980), the court held that
replacement of a discharged employee by a person from a nonprotected class was not a re-
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forty-five-year-old person has just as strong a case when the replacement is
less than forty years old and hence not a member of the protected class.2' 4
It is not clear whether a disparate impact theory of unlawful age
discrimination is available under the federal Act. Unlike Title VII, the
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act expressly permits distinc-
tions based upon "reasonable factors other than age." 2"' This provision
may permit facially-neutral factors to have a disproportionate impact on
older persons. For example, physical qualifications or decisions based upon
cost 216 to the employer might be found lawful under the federal Act. Never-
theless, federal cases under the age Act have invalidated employment prac-
tices which were proven to have a disparate impact and were not shown to
be job related." 7 Thus, if these federal decisions are followed in the Illinois
courts, any requirement which results in a disproportionate impact on the
aged must be job related to be valid.
The federal law, similar to the Illinois Human Rights Act, permits age
discrimination where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.2",
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,1 9 a Title VII case, the court explained that the
bona fide occupational qualification defense is "extremely narrow. '220 An
employment practice which excludes all members of a protected class-for
example, a prohibition of women from occupying certain positions as
prison guards-is valid "only when the essence of the business operation
would be undermined" by an alternative rule22' and when there exists a
quirement for a prima facie case of age discrimination. See also Age Discrimination in
Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1981) (prohibits discrimination within the 40-65 age bracket;
therefore, if two individuals within this group apply for a single job, employment decision
must be made on non-age based factors).
214. See LARSON, supra note 151, at § 98.53.
215. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976) (permits
qualifications based on age if reasonably necessary to normal business operations).
216. Cost-based employer decisions may have a more negative impact on older, more highly
paid workers. See 46 Fed. Reg. 47,727 (1981) (a differentiation based on the average cost of
employing older employees as a group is unlawful except with respect to certain employee benefit
plans) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f)). See generally LARSON, supra note 15 1, at § 100.25;
Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979).
217. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981); Laugensen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975). Recently promulgated
EEOC regulations assert that to be upheld under the Act, employment criteria which have a
disparate impact on members of the protected age group must be justified as business
necessities. 46 Fed. Reg. 47,727 (1981) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d)).
218. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). The corresponding provi-
sion in Illinois is the Human Rights Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-104(A) (1981).
219. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
220. Id. at 334. See also Age Discrimination in Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1981) (ex-
ception permitting bona fide occupational qualifications based on age shall be interpreted nar-
rowly).
221. 433 U.S. at 333 (emphasis in original) (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442
F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (femaleness was not a bona fide occupational qualification for
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"factual basis for believing that all or substantially all [class members] ...
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job in-
volved."' 22
The United States Supreme Court has not defined the parameters of the
bona fide occupational qualification for the purposes of the federal age
Act. Although several circuits have addressed the issue, 23 these decisions
evidence disagreement as to whether the defense is as narrowly interpreted
under the age Act as it is under Title VII.2 4 For example, in Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines,22 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determin-
ed that an employer need not demonstrate a factual basis for believing that
"all or substantially all" persons over the age of thirty-five would be
unable to drive safely and efficiently to justify the maximum hiring age re-
quirement as a bona fide occupational qualification. Rejecting the standard
of Title VII and circuits which had adopted this standard in age Act cases,
the Greyhound court determined that when the safety of others is at issue,
age limitations may be a bona fide occupational qualification if the
employer has a reasonable basis in fact for believing that the elimination of
its maximum hiring age will increase the likelihood of risk to other
persons. 226
the job of flight cabin attendant), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)). See also Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (6th Cir. 1969) (1ialeness was not a bona fide
occupational qualification for the job of switchman).
222. 433 U.S. at 3213 (1977).
223. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977) (employer must prove that
occupational qualification is reasonably necessary to his business and that there exists a
reasonable basis for believing that those within the age classification could not perform their
tasks, or that it would be unduly burdensome to individually scrutinize those within the age
group); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.) (finding that age con-
stitutes a bona fide occupational qualification must be based on evidence relating to age fac-
tors of the specific occupation in which plaintiff was engaged, not on age factors of the
general population), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,
531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant's occupational qualification upheld because plaintiff
failed to show that defendant could make individual determination as to job safety and
efficiency of persons within the age classification); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859
(7th Cir. 1974) (because of bus company's duty to assure passenger safety, bus company need
only demonstrate a minimal increase in the risk of harm without the age classification in order
to prove a bona fide occupational qualification), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Greyhound
Lines, 419U.S. 1122 (1975).
224. Compare Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974) (proof that
among the general population the human body deteriorates after age 35 brought maximum hir-
ing age policy within the bona fide occupational qualification exception for the position of in-
tercity bus driver) with Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977)
(some evidence showing that test pilots aged more slowly than members of the general popula-
tion was found inadequate to sustain pilot's termination due to age when age was claimed to
be a bona fide occupational qualification).
225. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974).
226. Id. at 863. Practitioners in the area of employment discrimination also should be aware
of the retaliatory discharge cause of action. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978), the court recognized a case of action for retaliatory discharge when the
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CONCLUSION
Comparatively, the law of employment discrimination in Illinois is
substantially less developed than federal law. The full contours of both con-
stitutional and statutory protections remain largely unexplored. The state
laws nevertheless provide employees and job applicants with a considerable
arsenal of rights which may often be vindicated at considerably less expense
than resort to the federal system typically involves.
action for which the employee was terminated was an exercise of a statutory right even in the
absence of a statutorily provided remedy for employer interference with that right. See gen-
erally Grove & Garry, Employment-at- Will in Illinois: Implications and Anticipations for the
Practitioner, 31 DEPAUL L. REv. 359 (1982).
